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Symbolic and Concrete Demands in Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
Rotem Nagar and Jacob Shamir  
Abstract 
Researchers have recently leveled criticism at the realist approach to conflict resolution by 
pointing out the importance of symbolic aspects of this issue.  Few studies, however, have hitherto 
focused on symbolic demands in conflicts.  The present study examines the role of symbolic as 
well as concrete demands in conflict resolution, and is therefore innovative in this regard.  A 
demand is categorized as “concrete” if it is based on an interest that is viable and applicable, 
in that it involves tangible resources that may change hands or be divided.  A “symbolic” 
demand, on the other hand, pivots on either refraining from or tak ing action rather than on a 
tangible result.  With reference to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this research suggests that the 
relationship between symbolic and concrete demands can serve as a tool for achieving 
conflict resolution – not only by compensating for symbolic demands with concrete demands 
and vice versa but also by balancing between the symbolic and the concrete aspects within the 
same demand.  These findings may have valuable implications for the use of symbolic discourse 
as an instrument to transform conflicts. 
Introduction 
According to the classical realist approach to conflict resolution, the parties’ actions 
are motivated by the desire to advance their interests and maximize their gains, and therefore 
symbolic aspects of the issue are deemed irrelevant.  During the last two decades, however, 
realist researchers have conceded that, within the boundaries of the realist research of 
negotiations, symbolic aspects should not be dismissed altogether – albeit recognizing them 
only as part of a game whose object is to maximize gains (Zartman, 1983).  This approach 
has, in turn, incurred criticism, on the grounds that conflicts can be better understood through 
the prism of symbolism rather than realism (Faure, 1999; Kaufman & Bisharat, 2002).  Thus, 
in investigations of conflict resolution, the importance of symbolic issues in conflicts has 
recently come to the forefront.  
To the extent that symbols are at the heart of conflicts, matters of honor and guilt may 
be more important than even the central resource of the village life – the land (Nader & Todd, 
1978).  Issues that accumulate throughout a conflict have symbolic value that may "defy 
simple, rational understanding" (Faure, 1999, p. 20) and pertain to human suffering and 
honor, rather than to land and houses that have been lost forever (Kaufman & Bisharat, 
2002).  
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Conflicts are based on key rights and/or demands that arise from basic identity 
metaphors and narratives (Zartman, 1983; Ross, 2001).  Accordingly, human rights have 
become an integral part of conflict resolution (Gaer, 1997; Kaufman & Bisharat, 2002).  
Conflicts have also come to involve sacred values (such as justice), which are perceived as 
absolute and uncompromisable (Atran et al., 2007; Atran & Axelrod, 2008; Wade-Benzoni et 
al., 2002).  It is not surprising, therefore, that barriers in fundamental political conflicts often 
include differences in the sacred values and narratives of the sides (Susskind et al., 2005; 
Bazerman et al., 2008).  Conversely, a symbolic gesture recognizing the values of the “other” 
may facilitate the negotiation and even resolution of a charged conflict.  Moreover, symbolic 
meanings may have a powerful effect on the actions of the negotiating parties (Faure, 1999).  
Indeed, in international politics, nations’ behavior is not based solely on considerations of 
power and sheer interests, but often involves aspirations for justice as well (Welch, 1993). 
In conflicts accompanied by turbulent emotions and disagreements over prestige, the 
solution to the crisis may lie in a symbolic remedy (Cohen, 1997).  However, to secure just 
and legitimate peace, the symbolic sacrifice may not be enough: more matters must be 
settled, including recognition of the “other” as an entity with an identity, history and culture 
(the so-called “thin recognition”) and understanding the basic characteristics of the “other” 
(“wide recognition”) (Allan & Keller, 2006).  Recognizing the rights of the “other,” even on 
the declarative level, may provide the basis for a constructive negotiation and demonstrate a 
symbolic willingness to settle the conflict (Kaufman & Bisharat, 2002). Yet, in spite of the 
findings that point to the importance of symbolic aspects in conflict resolution, few 
researchers have examined the effect of symbolic demands on international political 
processes.  The present study seeks to fill this void by developing an approach in conflict 
research that acknowledges the limitations of the realist models and examines the role of 
symbolic demands, as well as their relation to concrete demands, in conflict resolution 
processes.  In addition to offering a new theoretical perspective on this issue, we focus on the 
practical implications of the analysis of conflict resolution processes, and especially the use 
of symbolic discourse as an instrument to transform conflicts.  
Concrete and Symbolic Demands 
The concepts of concrete and symbolic demands are based on Fraser's (1995) 
theoretical work.  Fraser described a conceptual continuum between two types of demands 
for social justice: recognition and redistribution.  Demands for distributive justice stem from 
socio-economic injustice linked to the economic structure.  Demands for identity recognition 
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arise out of cultural injustice rooted in social patterns of representation, interpretation and 
communication. Unlike the paradigm of redistribution, cultural injustice aligns better with 
Webber’s status groups than with Marx’s classes.  While, according to the redistribution 
paradigm, the solution is a new economic structure, the remedy suggested by the recognition 
paradigm is a symbolic change (Fraser & Honneth, 2003).  
Fraser’s model has sparked disagreement among scholars.  Young (1997) contends 
that it represents a false dichotomy, and that redistribution and recognition are not mutually 
exclusive, but rather both stem from a demand for justice.  Honneth (2001) censures Fraser’s 
work, imputing to it Marxist economic reductionism, and arguing that redistribution is 
essential for justice but should be subsumed under the category of recognition.  Economic 
injustice, on Honneth’s view, is experienced as injustice stemming from disrespect, for 
example the violation of a complex order of recognition in society.  
While conceding that recognition and redistribution are not “clear-cut” categories, we 
will argue – contrary to Honneth’s (2001) approach – that the distinction between them is 
meaningful, and that therefore this dualism deserves a place in the study of political demands 
in negotiation.  In line with Fraser (1995, 1998), we will attempt to demonstrate that an 
analytic distinction can be drawn between demands that are primarily symbolic, such as 
recognition, justice and apology, on the one hand, and demands that are inherently concrete, 
such as distribution of territory, water etc., on the other.  Our working hypothesis to this 
effect is that demands set forth in negotiations can be located on a bi-polar continuum 
ranging from “symbolic” to “concrete.”  The mapping of the various demands, and the 
analysis of the relations between them, should be performed bearing in mind the uncertainties 
involved in delimiting the two categories and the possibility that any specific demand may be 
linked to both ends of the spectrum. 
We categorize a demand as concrete if it is based on an interest that is viable and 
applicable, in that it includes tangible resources that may change hands or be divided.  For a 
demand to be symbolic, its meaning must lie in the action of making it and not in a tangible 
result.  While any specific demand might carry both a symbolic and a concrete connotation, 
we classify it as either symbolic or concrete depending on the phrasing.  Thus “water” is 
arguably an emotionally charged term, but at the same time it is an important physical 
resource. Consequently, a specific suggestion regarding the use of water is considered a 
concrete demand. Similarly, while recognition is usually perceived as a purely symbolic act, a 
demand to accept the end of demands is, in itself, a legal political demand which has the 
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concrete significance of assuring the other side that no additional demands, concrete or 
symbolic, can be made.  In this case, even though no material property has changed hands, 
the right to make demands has been forfeited, and this has strong concrete implications.  
Methodology 
In this study, the role of symbolic and concrete demands in conflict resolution is 
examined in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  The situation investigated is rife 
with political symbolism due to the sides’ strong emotional attitudes regarding questions of 
land, nation, security and survival.  It has been argued that the failure of Israeli and 
Palestinian leaders to reach a solution is attributable to symbolic factors (Hermann & 
Newman, 2000).  
Negotiations to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict epitomize a contrast between 
symbolic discourse regarding recognition and justice, on the one hand, and concrete discourse 
regarding resources in a framework of costs and benefits, on the other.  Most researchers 
concur that the Palestinian side tends to perceive the conflict in terms of rights and frame its 
demands in terms of justice, focusing on key values (Albin, 2001; Allan & Keller, 2006; 
Peled & Rouhana, 2007).  By contrast, the Israeli side purportedly frames the negotiation in 
terms of rational cost-benefit analysis centered on considerations of security and territory 
(Albin, 2001; Shamir & Shikaki, 2010; Sabet, 1998).  It goes without saying that this 
difference in perception is reflected in the public and the political arenas; it determines the 
framing of the conflict management in public discourse and influences the assessment of 
possibilities for various solutions.  
In this study, the symbolic and concrete aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations 
were examined using two methodological tools: (1) interviews with politicians and experts on 
both sides who had been involved in the peace process over the years, and (2) surveys to 
gauge the Israeli and Palestinian public opinion.  
Politicians and Experts Involved In the Peace Process  
Our choice of the sample was motivated by two considerations.  First, the politicians 
and public figures we interviewed were familiar with the entire negotiation process and with 
the demands set forth by both parties over the years.  Moreover, these were the key figures in 
the peace process: the ones who had led the negotiations and suggested wordings to resolve 
the disputed issues.  
The respondents’ preferences for concrete versus symbolic demands were assessed 
based on semi-structured in-depth interviews.  The attitudes of the Israeli and the Palestinian 
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experts were examined with regard to each of the demands that had been subject to 
negotiation over the years: the right of return; recognizing the pain and suffering of the 
refugees; recognizing Israel’s part in creating the refugee problem; water rights; territory;  
security; end of the conflict; end of demands; mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as 
the national homes of their respective peoples; recognition of the State of Israel as a state of 
the Jewish people.  For each demand, we determine whether the interviewers treated it as 
symbolic or concrete, according to the analytic distinction elaborated above.  
The interviews with the Israeli experts were conducted in Hebrew and took place in 
Israel. The Palestinian experts were interviewed in Arabic, mostly in the West Bank, by a 
Palestinian Israeli and the interviews were subsequently translated into Hebrew.   
All in all, eleven interviews were conducted with Israeli Jewish experts and politicians. 
All Israeli interviewees studied in depth the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and had participated in 
formal and informal negotiations, as negotiators or as political consulates, among them the 
Oslo negotiations, the Taba Summit and the Camp David summit in 2000 and so on. 
Moreover, three of the Israeli interviewees participated in drafting the Geneva Accord, the 
only final status peace accord drafted jointly by Israelis and Palestinians  . 
Five interviews were conducted with Palestinian experts and politicians All 
Palestinian interviewees are senior public leaders, most of them in senior positions in the 
PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) and/or the Palestinian National Authority. Most of 
the Palestinian interviewees had participated in formal and informal negotiations, among 
them the Oslo negotiations, the Wye River discussions, the Taba Summit and the Camp 
David summit in 2000. Some of them participated in drafting the Geneva Accord.  All 
interviewees were assured that they will not be quoted directly, and to protect their identities, 
throughout the paper they will be referred to by random letters of the alphabet.  
Public Opinion among Israelis and Palestinians 
As stated before, in addition to the interviews, we conducted opinion polls among the 
Palestinian and Israeli publics.  The decision to study public opinion was prompted by the 
important role it plays in the two- level negotiation game (Putnam, 1988; Shamir & Shikaki, 
2010) and in foreign policy decisions (Holsti, 1992).  Indeed, it is public opinion that 
underlies collective wisdom and lends legitimacy to leaders and policies alike (Shamir & 
Shamir, 2000). Moreover, given the reciprocal relation between state leadership and public 
opinion (Shamir, 2005), an analysis of each cannot be complete without the understanding of 
the other.  Public opinion is known to be sensitive to symbolic gestures and lend support to a 
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negotiator who comes up with an appropriate wording to frame a demand – this may be 
especially the case in conflicts over symbolic values (Shamir & Shikaki, 2010).  It is 
therefore necessary to examine the views of both publics investigated, on both symbolic and 
material issues, particularly in light of their sensitivity to the symbolic aspects of this specific 
debate.  
The data are based on the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Poll (JIPP), which has 
simultaneously tracked Israeli and Palestinian public opinion since 2000.  The polls were 
planned and supervised by Prof. Yaacov Shamir, of the Harry S. Truman Research Institute 
for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the 
Hebrew University, and Prof. Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy 
and Survey Research (PSR).  In addition to using data from the polls conducted since the year 
of 2000, we developed several questions regarding demands related to redistribution and 
recognition and included them in the December 2008 and March 2010 polls (Israeli poll: 
N=600; Palestinian poll: N=1270).  In all the surveys the Palestinian data are based on face-
to-face interviews conducted among representative samples in Gaza, the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem.  The Israeli data comprise of interviews with representative samples of adult 
Israelis conducted over the phone in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian.  The Israeli sample is 
weighted based on the proportion of Arab and Jewish citizens in the general population, as 
well as on the results of the general elections preceding the poll.  
Respondents were presented with pairs of issues, one symbolic and the other concrete, 
and asked which among the two they deemed the more important.  In all the pairs, symbolic 
gains were centered around recognition, due to the importance of this issue in the day-to-day 
political discourse, while concrete issues focused on territorial compromises.  Israeli 
respondents were asked to choose between Palestinian recognition of Israel as the state of the 
Jewish people versus sovereignty over Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem.  In addition, 
they were asked to choose between Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state versus 
sovereignty over settlement blocs in Judea and Samaria.  Palestinian respondents were asked 
to choose between Israeli recognition of the right of return, accompanied by the return of 
refugees to Palestine (but not to Israel), versus a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders.  In 
addition, they were asked to choose between Israeli recognition of the right of return, 
accompanied by the return of refugees to Palestine (but not to Israel) versus Palestinian 
sovereignty over Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem.  
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In addition, each participant was asked to rank two symbolic and two concrete 
demands in terms of their importance.  The demands that were presented to the Israeli sample 
and those that were presented to the Palestinian sample had nearly identical social and 
cultural significance for the sides.  The following demands were presented randomly to the 
Israeli sample: Creating early warning facilities within the Palestinian state to prevent a 
surprise attack; Palestinian recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people; securing 
Israel’s water rights; Palestinian recognition of Israeli pain and suffering throughout the 
conflict (2008), or alternatively, Palestinian declaration of the “end of the conflict” (2010).  
The demands that were randomly presented to the Palestinian sample were as follows: safe 
passage between the West Bank and Gaza; Israeli recognition of Palestine as the home of the 
Palestinian people; securing Palestinian water rights in any future agreement; Israeli 
recognition of the pain and suffering caused to the Palestinians throughout the conflict.  In 
order to compare the issues in terms of their importance to the respondents, each of the issues 
presented to both the Israeli and the Palestinian participants was assigned an index of 
importance based on the following formula:  
Index of Importance (only for the questions that involved ranking in terms of 
importance):   
(1) 
(Frequency as first priority)*4 + (frequency of as second priority)*3 + 
(frequency as third priority)*2 + (frequency as last priority)*1.  
Findings: Examining the Symbolic-Concrete Continuum for Each Side  
Experts’ Assessment of Each Negotiated Demand as Symbolic and/or Concrete 
The right of return. 
Most Israeli interviewees distinguished between a declarative symbolic recognition of 
the right of return and its concrete implementation.  The prevailing feeling among the Israeli 
participants was that, throughout peace negotiations, Palestinians have emp hasized the 
symbolic demand in this regard but have been willing to compromise on its concrete 
implementation. Israeli interviewee A, for example, stated that “the declaration is more 
important to them... than the actual implementation. It is important to their leadership... [it is] 
important to their people, it’s important to the refugees.”  The interviewees based their 
opinions on both formal and informal negotiations.  Thus, Israeli interviewee E mentioned 
the Geneva Accord, in which, as he put it, the Palestinians “gave up the right of return in 
exchange for a symbolic right of return.” Israeli interviewee F brought up the negotiations 
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with Yasser Arafat, contending that Arafat's historic “trade-off,” as he called it, “was to 
exchange Palestinian sovereignty over Temple Mount for the right to return,” a concession 
that is both material and symbolic.  In the same light the Israeli interviewees saw the Arab 
Initiative for Peace.  Thus, participant F believed that the Arab League's March 2009 decision 
clearly indicates that the Palestinian side is willing to forgo any actual return of refugees.  
The Palestinian interviewees emphasized that recognition is essential but not 
sufficient, and that concrete implementation is needed.  They noted, however, that they are 
well aware that the extent of the right of return must be regulated based on an agreement with 
Israel, or in other words, that not all refugees would return to the State of Israel.  Their 
responses distinguished between the recognition of each refugee's right to return and a limited 
implementation of this right.  Palestinian interviewee N asserted that the Palestinians 
“understand that, at the end of the process [peace negotiations], not all refugees can or would 
want to return.”  He went on to say that, while “for Palestinians, recognition of the right of 
return is very important... they know that there is a difference between having a right and 
realizing it.”  Palestinian interviewee M stated that “Israel must recognize this right in 
principle... We need to… separate between… the issue of recognizing the right and the 
responsibility for the great crime… and the issue of implementation.” 
Recognizing the pain and suffering of the refugees and recognizing Israel’s part 
in creating the refugee problem. 
Most Israeli interviewees saw recognition of the pain and suffering of the Palestinian 
refugees as an important part of the negotiation, which may serve as a compensation for more 
concrete concessions.  However, no consensus emerged regarding Israel’s obligation to 
accept responsibility for creating the refugee problem. Indeed, some of the respondents 
expressed the belief that the pain and suffering of the Palestinian people ought to be 
recognized, albeit without taking blame for it.  Israeli interviewee I felt that hundreds of 
Palestinians “want the feeling that Israel says that it admits… responsibility for what 
happened with the refugees.”  However, in the Geneva Accord “we did go that far 
recognizing the suffering caused to the Palestinian people [without taking responsibility].”  In 
his opinion, recognition of the Palestinian suffering is important, and if the Palestinian 
representatives in the Geneva negotiation had been satisfied in this regard, this would have 
had “a good effect on the Palestinian public opinion.”  Israeli interviewee J, who suggested 
that Israel should recognize the pain and suffering, saw the Palestinian demand that 
recognition of pain and suffering should be combined with acceptance of responsibility as 
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“an impossible combination” – and as he put it, “a zero-sum game.”  On the other hand, 
Israeli interviewee C believed that accepting responsibility is important for the negotiation. 
He stated that the third and fourth generations of refugees: 
“…want two things... one is related to the  concrete dimension and the other to 
the symbolic dimension. Regarding the concrete dimension, they want a 
solution… in terms of compensation and rehabilitation in exchange for their 
terrible loss... Regarding the symbolic dimension... it’s [for Israel] to stand up 
and apologize.” 
The Palestinian side also attached great importance to recognizing the pain and 
suffering of refugees, but pointed out that Israel must accept responsibility for the emergence 
of the refugee problem.  Moreover, they emphasized that this recognition must be 
accompanied by concrete actions.  Palestinian interviewee M stated that the solution to the 
refugee problem requires “first and foremost” Israeli recognition of the Nakba and of Israel's 
responsibility for it, and underscored the practical implications of such responsibility: “I 
don’t care about the apology if it is not accompanied by a practical procedure...”  Palestinian 
interviewee A held a similar position, stating: “Recognizing the pain and suffering is 
important but it's not everything. To achieve peace, we want to see… things happening in the 
Palestinian people's reality.” 
Water rights. 
All but one of the Israeli interviewees expressed a pragmatic view of this issue, 
seeking alternative technical solutions to dividing the Mountain Aquifer, such as desalination.  
Palestinian interviewees likewise focused on the concrete aspect of the situa tion, namely, the 
need for an equal share of the water.  Unlike the Israelis, however, Palestinian interviewees 
offered fewer specific solutions to the problem.  Palestinian Interviewee N stated that, to the 
best of his knowledge as a member of the committee that negotiated water rights, “there is 
nothing symbolic, it’s a practical thing.”  Palestinian Interviewee O was one of two 
respondents who spoke in terms of justice: “We want a fair and just solution to the division of 
resources and water.”  Palestinian Interviewee M highlighted the Palestinians rights under 
international law, but also called for an equitable division of the water.  
Territory (including the Jerusalem question).  
It has been widely acknowledged that any debate over territory includes both 
symbolic and concrete aspects, and this is especially so when the point of contention is 
Jerusalem and its sacred sites.  Nevertheless, both the Israeli and the Palestinian interviewees 
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revealed for the most part a pragmatic attitude in this matter, and their approach to the issue 
pivoted on practical solutions for the division of territories.  Indeed, most saw Jerusalem as a 
divisible resource – in fact, in their view, it was already divided, for all intents and purposes.  
Israeli interviewees E, C, and J offered solutions involving an exchange of territory. 
Interviewee J even quantified the problem, asserting that a “serious” disagreement was 
confined to 5% of the West Bank, while the debate over the rest of the territory had been 
resolved by prior negotiations.  Israeli Interviewee A suggested that a concession in terms of 
territorial exchange can help achieve compromises on the right of return.  Israeli interviewee 
B supported a pragmatic approach to territorial issues, criticizing the shift in the attitude of 
the Israeli public from pragmatic to symbolic, expressed in the discourse focusing on 
“historical rights to the land of Israel.”  He rejected the “united Jerusalem” approach, stating 
that the issue is not pragmatic (“no one looks at the map”) and that “the unity of Jerusalem” 
has become “a slogan.” 
The Palestinian interviewees’ discussion of territory likewise centered on practical 
solutions.  Palestinian interviewees L, N, P and O spoke of recognizing the 1967 borders and 
allocating land based on territorial exchange.  L stated that territory is a pragmatic rather than 
a symbolic issue: “From a pragmatic perspective, I know that to get Hebron I need to give up 
Haifa.  I can’t get both Haifa and Hebron.  I expect the same of the Israeli side.” 
Security. 
As is the case with territory, it has been widely acknowledged that security is an issue 
that incorporates symbolic as well as concrete aspects.  Here, too, the interviews revealed a 
pragmatic approach on the part of the Israeli respondents, most of whom addressed the issue 
by offering practical solutions.  Israeli interviewee I, for example, explained why any 
solution in this regard must involve demilitarization in exchange for “strategic depth” 
(strategic presence of Israeli forces outside of the Green Line). Israeli interviewee H 
described the security problem as a complex set of “technical issues” that are already being 
solved on a daily basis.  As in the discussions of territory, a number of Israeli interviewees 
criticized what they saw as symbolic intransigence on security issues among Israeli public.  
Israeli interviewee G, for example, criticized the insistence of the Israeli side on reserving the 
right to fly over the West Bank, and contended that it was a symbolic demand with no 
substance to it: “What's the area of the West Bank for an F15 or F16?... It’s a joke.” 
On the Palestinian side, interviewees N, M and L offered specific suggestions in 
connection with security issues.  Thus, interviewee N spoke about an international presence 
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in the Jordan Rift Valley, and the possibility of using radar and satellite dishes in the West 
Bank. Similarly, interviewee M suggested that an international force be present, “for the short 
or long term as determined by both sides.”  Interviewee L chose to discuss a security model 
proposed as part of the Geneva Accord.  Palestinian interviewees M and P, on the other hand, 
saw security as a tool used by Israel to seize land.  
End of the conflict and end of demands. 
“End of the conflict” is a political demand that the accord mark the formal end of the 
conflict. “End of demands” is a political- legal demand that both parties' demands be set down 
in the accord, such that, once the accord has been signed, parties can only claim its 
implementation.  
While some of the Israeli interviewees saw both these demands as concrete and 
essential, others saw the end of demands as a concrete claim, while the end of the conflict as 
symbolic. From the responses of Israeli interviewees, it was clear that those who viewed end 
of the conflict as a concrete demand believed it to be important. Interviewees who saw this 
demand as symbolic, on the other hand, were divided as to its importance for the peace 
process.  Thus, for Israeli interviewee K, both demands were essential:  
 If you leave things open, then we haven’t ended the conflict… It’s very 
important for Israel that the peace agreement should stipulate the end of the 
conflict… Regarding demands, that’s a legal issue. This means all the 
demands… have been settled.  
 In contrast, in the opinion of Israeli interviewee B, the end of demands is a legal 
contract, while the end of the conflict symbolizes the shift from a pragmatic public discussion 
to a symbolic public discussion, the latter characteristic of Israeli public opinion in recent 
years. Similarly, Interviewee C regarded the end of the conflict as “something that we… I 
don’t want to say we made it up, but maybe we did.”  In his view, the end of the conflict 
demand has no concrete significance; yet, in the Geneva Accord, he had pushed for its 
inclusion on account of its symbolic value, which – he believed – could serve as “a tool that 
would help sell the agreement to the Israeli public.” 
On the Palestinian side, all the interviewees attached importance to both demands in 
equal measure.  Unlike the Israelis, the Palestinians saw both the end of the conflict and the 
end of demands claim as endowed with concrete significance.  For example, Palestinian 
interviewee N stated that both demands were important “from the perspective that both sides 
can be sure that they have solved all the problems.”  Similarly, Palestinian interviewee P 
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believed both these demands to be important and pointed to the section of the Arab Peace 
Initiative referring to them. 
Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the national homes of their 
respective peoples and recognition of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people. 
Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the national homes of their respective 
peoples and recognition of the state of Israel as the state of the Jewish people are inherently 
symbolic demands, which according to our definition above are not accompanied by tangible 
concessions.  During the interviews, we examined how important the demands for 
recognition are to each of the sides. 
While some of the Israeli interviewees supported the demand of mutual recognition, 
all had reservations about demanding recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people. 
Israeli interviewee C, for example, proposed an alternative wording, namely, that both sides 
acknowledge the right to mutual self-determination:  
The way we did it in the Geneva Accord was much more clever, since in the 
Geneva Accord, or even in other places... we said that each of the States can 
determine its own identity, or we said Israel defining itself as the home of the 
Jewish people, say, signs an agreement with the Palestinian State defining 
itself as the national home of the Palestinian people.  So that way you don’t 
demand that the other side recognize your self-determination, but you demand 
that the other side acknowledge that you have the right to self-determination... 
Israeli interviewee B believed that it is impossible to reach an agreement without 
dealing with the issue of mutual recognition, and offered what he described as a “simple 
solution”:  “For example, repeat the wording of the UN Partition Plan... and that’s the end of 
it... It’s a pragmatic solution to a supposedly symbolic question.”  However, he went on to 
say, this solution “is never going to materialize if Israel insists on the ‘symbolic issue’ of 
recognizing Israel as the state of the Jewish people, while pragmatically, we don’t need 
Palestinians to recognize that: we decide what kind of a country it is.”  He sees this demand 
as a part of the above-mentioned process whereby Israeli discourse has shifted from 
pragmatic to symbolic issues.  Israeli interviewees I and E were exceptions, in that they 
disagreed with the notion of mutual recognition as well as with the demand to recognize 
Israel as the state of the Jewish people.  They asserted that there is no need to demand mutual 
recognition.  E, for example, stated that a clause addressing mutual recognition should not be 
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included in any peace agreement, since such recognition has already been given in the past 
and, additionally, no such clause appears in any other peace agreement in the Middle East.  
In contrast to the Israelis, Palestinian interviewees were not in agreement regarding 
the significance of mutual recognition of national homes, and some opposed this notion.  
However, all the Palestinian interviewees concurred with their Israeli counterparts in that 
each state may define itself however it sees fit, and claimed that political recognition would 
only complicate the issue.  For example, Palestinian interviewee M opposed mutual 
recognition stating, “because what’s important to the agreement are two things: mutual 
political recognition of sovereignty of each state, and then ending the conflict, such that there 
will be no demands in the future...”  He stated that Israel can define itself in any way it 
chooses but the Palestinians should recognize it as it is recognized by international law.  On 
the other hand, Palestinian interviewee L declared mutual recognition to be “definitely” 
important.  As for recognizing Israel as the state of the Jewish people, he leaves it to the State 
of Israel to decide: “I believe it is up to the Israelis to declare the nature of their state...” 
The Importance of Concrete and Symbolic Demands in Public Opinion 
Israeli public opinion. 
In the opinion of the Israeli public as of December 2008 and March 2010, the most 
important demand was the recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people – in marked 
contrast to the Israeli interviewees, who tended to minimize the importance of this demand.  
In the December 2008 survey, this symbolic demand was ranked first, and two concrete 
demands – securing water rights and setting up early warning facilities – as second and third.  
Palestinian recognition of Israeli suffering was ranked as the least important.  In March 2010, 
the demand for the end of the conflict was ranked second, but it was not clear whether it was 
regarded as concrete or symbolic.  The demands ranked third and fourth were securing water 
rights and setting up early warning facilities, in that order.  
In addition to ranking their preferences in the negotiations, the respondents were 
asked to choose between Palestinian recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people 
and territorial compromises.  The results showed a clear preference for the former over the 
latter. In December 2008, 50% of respondents preferred Palestinian recognition of Israel as 
the state of the Jewish people to sovereignty over Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem 
(35%; 6% did not prefer either option, and 10% did not respond or did not know).  In the 
March 2010 poll, 55% preferred Palestinian recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish 
people, while 25% preferred Israeli sovereignty over Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusa lem; 
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11% did not prefer either option, and 10% did not respond or did not know.  Of the 
respondents who preferred Palestinian recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people 
(N=273), 50% said that they find this much more important than securing sovereignty over 
East Jerusalem; 34% said they find it somewhat more important, and 12% said they find it 
slightly important (5% did not respond or did not know).  
In the December 2008 poll, 46% preferred Palestinian recognition of Israel as the state 
of the Jewish people, while 41% preferred sovereignty over settlement blocs in Judea and 
Samaria; 5% did not prefer either option, and 9% did not respond or did not know.  In March 
2010, 38% preferred Palestinian recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people, while 
31% preferred Israeli sovereignty over settlement blocs in Judea and Samaria; 11% did not 
prefer either option, and 20% did not respond or did not know.  Of the respondents who 
indicated a preference for Palestinian recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people 
(N=273), 50% said that they see this as much more important than Israeli sovereignty over 
the settlements in Judea and Samaria; 35% said it was somewhat more important, and 12% 
said it was slightly more important (3% did not respond or did not know). 
Thus it appears that, contrary to the belief commonly held among scholars that the 
Israeli approach is predominantly concrete, the reality is more complex: Israelis tend to uphold 
concrete as well as symbolic demands. 
Palestinian public opinion. 
Like the Israelis, the Palestinian respondents ranked Israeli recognition of Palestine as 
the state of the Palestinian people as their first priority.  The second preference was the 
concrete issue of safe passage between the West Bank and Gaza, and the third was the 
symbolic demand for Israeli recognition of the pain and suffering caused to the Palestinians 
throughout the conflict. Last came securing Palestinian water rights in any future agreement.  
These findings hold true for both 2008 and 2010. 
In a poll conducted in 2003, most Palestinian refugees insisted that any agreement 
with Israel must ensure their right to return to their homes and property within Israel.  The 
majority of the respondents, however, expressed a wish to live within the Palestinian state 
(31% in Gaza and the West Bank and 23% in Israeli territories that they envisioned as being 
made part the Palestinian state) or in a different host country (17%), rather than in Israel 
(10%).  This indicates that, at that time, the right of return was seen primarily as a symbolic 
right, which most respondents did not intend to realize. 
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The December 2008 poll indicates that, at that time, 50% of Palestinian respondents 
preferred a state based on the 1967 borders over Israeli recognition of the right of return 
accompanied by a return of refugees to Palestine but not to Israel.  Only 24% preferred Israeli 
recognition of the right of return, even at the cost of a smaller state.  Nineteen percent did not 
prefer either option, and 4% did not respond or did not know. 
In March 2010, 56% of the Palestinian respondents preferred a Palestinian state based 
on the 1967 borders over Israeli recognition of the right of return.  Twenty-five percent 
preferred Israeli recognition and 18% did not respond or did not know.  Of the respondents 
who preferred a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders (N=716), 52% said that this is 
much more important to them than Israeli recognition; 39% said it was somewhat more 
important, and 8% said it was slightly more important (0.7% did not respond or did not 
know). 
We also asked the respondents to choose between Israeli recognition of the right of 
return, with a limited number of Palestinians returning to greater Jerusalem, versus 
Palestinian sovereignty over Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem.  In December 2008, 38% 
chose Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem and 33% chose Israeli recognition; 23% 
did not prefer either option, and 7% did not respond or did not know. In March 2010, 43% 
chose Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem and 35% chose Israeli recognition; 22% 
did not respond or did not know.  Of the respondents who preferred Palestinian sovereignty 
over East Jerusalem (N=543), 50% said that this was much more important to them than 
Israeli recognition; 34% said that it was somewhat more important; and 11% said that it was 
slightly more important (1% did not respond or did not know).  
The Sides’ Perception of Each Other’s Preferences in Terms of the Symbolic-Concrete 
Continuum 
The Israeli interviewees’ perceptions of Palestinian attitudes diverged: some saw them 
as primarily pragmatic, while others as symbolic.  Israeli interviewee A, for example, 
described the Palestinians as completely pragmatic:  
The Palestinians, I think they care less about dramatic declarations, they want 
pragmatic results.  What they really want is… give me my freedom… give me 
the territory, I want the symbolism less now… Israel unfortunately sets a great 
store by such favors and such patronization, like I give you a flag, give you a 
national anthem, give you a song and screw you over – excuse me – in simple 
Hebrew, when it comes to territory, refugees, Jerusalem and the like...  
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 Israeli interviewee J felt that, initially, the Palestinians had emphasized more 
symbolic matters, but this had changed over the years:  
When we started the negotiations with the Palestinians, I was there pretty 
much from the very beginning, honor was the most important component for 
them and substance was almost meaningless.  They also didn’t quite 
understand, they didn’t prepare enough, they didn’t know the facts well... no 
one cared about the substance... That's not [the case] any more.  They have 
really changed, they’re organized, know their facts etc. Actually today the one 
who cares more about appearances is the Israeli side.  
In contrast, Israeli interviewees D, I, B, and H expressed the belief that symbolism is 
more important to the Palestinians than concrete demands.  Interviewee D described Israel’s 
attitude towards territory, water and refugee rights as a fundamentally technical platform, as 
opposed to the Palestinians' justice based approach. In his opinion, the conflict between these 
two attitudes presented an obstacle in previous negotiations, preventing the sides from eve n 
beginning to discuss solutions.  Interviewee B also believed that the Palestinians’ attitudes are 
mainly symbolic, but he felt that a change had recently occurred in the Israeli approach: today 
the Israeli side also concentrates on symbolism, rather than on practicality: 
 When I started dealing with this issue… 15 years ago… in the beginning, I 
thought a major part of the issue was the cultural differences between the two 
sides, mainly that we were the pragmatic ones… while they came with an 
attitude that cared more about symbols… I’m not so sure this is true [today].  
That is, when I look at the importance that is assigned by our side to issues 
like the unity of Jerusalem… when I know that anyone who knows anything 
about the subject and has examined it knows that the whole thing is pretty 
much a bluff. 
Israeli interviewees C, E, and G emphasized the importance of an approach that 
combines the symbolic and the pragmatic, realizing that symbols are of great importance to 
the Palestinians but also that symbolism cannot stand on its own.  Interviewee G actually 
criticized Israel for being too concrete in its approach, which he dubbed “the thrift-shop 
mentality.” 
While most of Israeli interviewees had formed an opinion regarding the location of 
Palestinian preferences on the concrete-symbolic continuum, the responses of the Palestinians 
were much more vague in this respect.  For example, Palestinian Interviewee N said that the 
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Israelis simply “want to get it all.”  In the same vein but in less categorical terms, Interviewee 
L stated: 
I can’t tell. What we see now are two issues: the issue of security and the 
recognition of the state of the Jewish people… The security issue is something 
we consider as physical. The recognition in the state of the Jewish people… is 
a bit confusing. It just gets in the way...  
The position of Palestinian interviewee M was somewhat more complex: he believed 
that the Israelis use symbols to justify their political demands.  
Discussion 
According to a commonly held view, which is also manifested in the academic 
literature, one of the main obstacles to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict stems from a 
disparity between a concrete Israeli orientation and a symbolic Palestinian approach.  The 
findings here reveal a far more complex reality, with both sides making symbolic and 
concrete claims simultaneously.  It appears, therefore, that the widespread assumption 
regarding the different nature of the demands made by each of the sides is unfounded.  
Furthermore, this study shows that this mistaken premise may, in itself, constitute an obstacle 
to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  More generally, in light of the finding 
obtained in this research, the hypothesis that there is a clear-cut distinction between symbolic 
and concrete cultures seems untenable.  Crucially, this idea is clearly counterproductive, as 
the data suggest that balancing between symbolic and concrete demands in a negotiation can 
serve as a tool for achieving conflict resolution.  
The Israeli Side 
Israeli interviewees were largely in agreement about the degree of importance of 
mutual recognition of Israel and Palestine as the national homes of their respective peoples, 
and some also supported the political demand that Palestine recognize Israel as the state of 
the Jewish people.  The literature on political recognition deals for the most part with the 
struggle of different groups within a joint social sphere, rather than with conflicts between 
states or nations. The interviews conducted for the purpose of this study show that, much as 
with individuals and groups, recognition is also sought and demanded by states.  Thus, our 
research contributes to the scholarly effort in this regard by extending the academic study of 
demands for recognition from the national-social to the international context.  
On issues of water rights, security and territory, Israeli interviewees appeared to favor 
the pragmatic approach.  Furthermore, the responses show that all the interviewees who saw 
Peace and Conflict Studies 
Volume 20, Number 2 
228 
the demand for the end of the conflict as concrete believed it to be important, while those 
who saw it as symbolic were divided as to its importance in the peace process.  
In the surveys, Israeli respondents unambiguously placed recognition of Israel as the 
state of the Jewish people as their top priority, preferring it over territorial demands.  The 
second and third preferences, however, were concrete.   
The Palestinian Side 
The interviews demonstrate that, although the Palestinians interviewees assigned great 
importance to symbolic demands, they did not discount concrete interests either.  The 
recognition of the right of return and of the pain and suffering of refugees was mentioned 
over and over again, as well as the demand to accept responsibility.  The literature is divided 
on the question of whether or not a political apology must involve accepting responsibility 
(Auerbach, 2004; Barkan, 2000; Cunningham, 1999; Rotberg, 2006; Rouhana, 2004; 
Weyeneth, 2001).  In our case, the Palestinians focused on the Israelis’ acknowledgment of 
responsibility as a symbolic gesture, which would necessarily entail an apology.  
According to the academic literature, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an example of 
a case in which the demand for justice has become a key issue.  Thus, the goal of the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process has frequently been defined as achieving a “just and stable peace” 
(Rouhana, 2004, p. 37), thereby rendering justice as a primary condition to forging peace.  
The present study has not supported the above theoretical premise.  The concepts of rights 
and justice rarely figured in the Palestinian conceptualizations of demands – in fact, these 
terms were mentioned only three times, in two interviews.  Instead of calling for justice, the 
Palestinian interviewees tended to frame specific, concrete demands designed to solve the 
problems of security, water, territory and more – although their solutions were less defined or 
detailed as compared to those advanced by the Israeli side.  And while putting emphasis on 
Israeli recognition of the right of return and on the refugees' pain and suffering, as well as on 
accepting responsibility for the refugee problem, the Palestinian interviewees clearly 
stipulated that these symbolic gestures must be translated into practical measures.  Thus, on 
the Palestinian side, the discussion of the refugee problem was by no means amorphous or 
wrapped in vague terminology such as justice or equity, but appeared to be firmly anchored 
in pragmatism and realism.  
As for Palestinian public opinion, the rankings given to symbolic and concrete 
demands show preference for both.  The first priority for most Palestinian respondents was a 
symbolic demand: Israeli recognition of Palestine.  Their next highest preference, however, 
Peace and Conflict Studies 
Volume 20, Number 2 
229 
was concrete: safe passage between the West Bank and Gaza.  Recognition of pain and 
suffering was clearly more important than water rights, a finding which points to the 
importance of the former issue for the Palestinian public.  The emphasis Palestinian public 
opinion places on concrete aspects was also evident from their preference for a state based on 
the 1967 borders or for sovereignty over Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem over 
recognition of the right of return.  
It is noteworthy that, while both sides weighed symbolic and concrete demands as 
equally important, neither side was aware of that tendency on the part of the other.  Israeli 
interviewees were divided on their perception of the Palestinians' place on the symbolic-
concrete continuum, but some of them clearly still saw the Palestinians' attitude as anchored 
primarily in symbolic values.  As mentioned previously, the prevailing assumption among 
scholars is that differences in symbolic versus concrete preferences serve as an obstacle to 
conflict resolution. Ironically, the results of this study indicate that it is the assumption itself 
that might constitute an obstacle in a quest for peace.  
From a different perspective, the Israeli interviewees' awareness of the symbolic 
needs of the Palestinians may be helpful in respond ing to the Palestinians’ demands.  The 
Israeli interviewees acknowledged the importance attached by Palestinians to Israel 
recognizing the right of return and the pain and suffering of the refugees, as well as to Israel 
accepting responsibility for the refugee problem.  As a result of this awareness, the Israeli 
interviewees were willing to acquiesce to the former two demands in order to advance the 
negotiations.  The Palestinian interviewees, on the other hand, had no clear perception of the 
Israelis' place on the symbolic-concrete continuum.  In so far as symbolic demands carry 
great weight in the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, this lack of awareness on the part of the 
Palestinians may prove an obstacle to constructive negotiation.  
As concerns symbolic versus concrete distinction, the present study has shown that 
the common assumption regarding a gap between the Israeli and the Palestinian preferences 
is unfounded.  On the other hand, a disparity emerged between groups within the Israeli 
society concerning the value of symbolic aspirations.   In the polls, Israeli respondents ranked 
the demand for Palestinian recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people as their top 
priority. In contrast, most of the Israeli interviewees believed that this demand for recognition 
is unnecessary, and may even be perceived by the other side as a provocation.   Public 
opinion is an important player in conflict resolution and, moreover, there is a reciprocal, 
inter-dependency relationship between public opinion and leaders.  Thus, the disparity found 
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between the opinions of the public and the persons interviewed should not be disregarded, 
since it constitutes an obstacle that may impede the negotiation and conflict resolution.  
Political processes of negotiation, conflict management and conflict resolution require 
common ground and shared understanding.  One of the central challenges in resolving 
international conflicts is the possible failure of talks or accords due to inter-group differences 
which hinder communication and prevent sides from agreeing upon shared rules of play 
(Wittes, 2005).  By the same token, the success of any political dialogue depends on 
understanding the goals and the discourse of the 'self' as well as learning about the 'other' 
(Gurevich, 2002; Sagi, 1999).  Our research demonstrates that, in a conflict, examining the 
needs and aspirations of sides through the lens of symbolic and concrete distinction is 
essential for promoting mutual understanding and toppling stereotypes.  
Thus, awareness of the symbolic and the concrete dimensions in one’s own as well as 
the other side’s aspirations is essential for dealing with conflicts. The Joint Israeli-Palestinian 
Polls (JIPP) conducted between 2003 and 2006 indicate that an overall package can receive 
greater support than its component parts.  People’s rationale is largely based on trade-offs, so 
one component may be seen as a compensation for another (Shamir & Shikaki, 2010).  This 
research has shown that the relationship between symbolic and concrete demands can serve 
as a tool for achieving a compensatory balance.  Israeli interviewees proposed varied ideas 
for symbolic acts as a compensation for concrete concessions.  The findings suggest, 
therefore, that understanding which core issues are seen mostly as concrete (for example 
land, in our case) and which as symbolic (for example, recognition) improves the chances 
that the sides will agree upon the overall package in a negotiation.  Put differently, in 
international conflict management and conflict negotiation, it is essential to understand and 
analyze the sides’ attitudes towards symbolic demands, as this may facilitate conflict 
resolution as well as reconciliation.  
As we maintained earlier, a demand can be seen as both symbolic and concrete.  The 
right of return issue, for example, has two dimensions: a concrete demand for physical return 
and a symbolic demand for recognition of the right to return.  We have found that a trade-off 
between the two dimensions can be used to achieve conflict resolution.  In the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, both sides agree that the right of return cannot possibly be realized by 
having all refugees return to Israeli territory within the Green Line.  This is evident from the 
results of the December 2011 JIPP poll: 45% among Palestinians support a solution based on 
permanent residency of the refugees in Palestinian and the Israeli areas transferred to 
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Palestinian  (residency in host countries, third countries, or Israel would be subject to the 
decision of these states).  While the refugee problem is generally seen as an intractable issue, 
in our study the interviewees on both sides asserted that recognizing the right of return can be 
exchanged for Palestinians waiving the actual return and thereby conceding that this right 
would ultimately remain unrealized.  This result suggests that openness to symbolic demands 
and the trade-off between the symbolic and the concrete dimensions within the same demand 
may serve as a means to promote conflict resolution.  Further studies may examine how this 
strategy can be applied to other international conflicts, based on an understanding of the 
importance of symbolic demands for recognition in conflicts.  
The above discussion does not imply that symbolic-concrete compensation is possible 
for all demands in a conflict.  The Palestinian interviewees were reluctant to agree to mutual 
recognition of Israel and Palestine as the national homes of their respective people, despite 
the importance attached to these demands by the Israeli side.  Furthermore, they spoke 
against recognizing Israel as the state of the Jewish people, in spite of this issue’s importance 
for the Israeli public opinion.  And while the Palestinian side set a great store by the Israeli 
acceptance of responsibility for the refugee problem, the Israeli interviewees were divided on 
whether this demand should be met.  It seems, therefore, that the study of conflict resolution 
can benefit from a better understanding of the ways in which recognition can serve as an 
obstacle to resolving conflicts, on the one hand, and as a tool to aid it, on the other.  
An assumption underlying the few studies dealing with the symbolic-concrete 
distinction regarding conflict resolution is that cultures can be classified into two clear-cut 
categories: symbolic versus concrete (Abu-Nimar, 1996; Cohen, 1997; Inbar & Yuchtman-
Yaar, 1985).  Yet, as we have seen in the Israeli case, within the same culture, public opinion 
and leadership can attach different importance to symbolic demands.  Thus, further research 
on symbolic aspects in conflict resolution would do well to cast such inter-culture 
assumptions aside.  The perception of a culture in academia must take into account its 
complex nature, and seemingly irrational phenomena should be examined based on the 
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